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ABSTRACT
This Article explores the standards of review that apply to corporate
conflict of interest transactions under Delaware Corporate Law. The first
Section of this Article discusses Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL) section 144 which deals with conflict of interest transactions by
corporate directors and officers. The Article goes on to recommend that the
statute be amended to include that once the provisions of section 144 are
satisfied, the transaction is cleansed of conflicted interest on the part of the
directors and officers and the business judgment rule will apply over the
more burdensome entire fairness standard. Additionally, this Article
discusses conflict of interest transactions by controlling shareholders and
summarizes the holdings left behind by Weinberger and its progeny. This
Article also discusses the third category of corporate conflict of interest
transactions that involve minority shareholders. Both Weinberger and
DGCL section 144 explicitly deal with conflict of interest transactions by
directors and officers or controlling shareholders. Therefore, there is a lack
of adequate regulation of conflict of interest transactions by minority
shareholders, namely minority activist shareholders. To fill this void in
Delaware Corporate Law, this Article recommends amending section 144 to
include interested minority shareholders. This amendment would subject
interested minority shareholder transactions to the entire fairness standard of
review unless one of the prongs of DGCL 144 are satisfied. If an interested
transaction by a minority shareholder satisfies section 144 through either the
approval of 1) a fully informed independent negotiating committee or 2) an
informed majority of the minority shareholder vote, the deferential business
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judgment rule will regulate the transaction. Similarly, if an interested
transaction by a minority shareholder is determined to be entirely fair under
section 144(a)(3), no further judicial scrutiny will be applied. Due to the
influence that minority activist shareholders may exert over a corporation’s
board, an increase in shareholder protections and a comparatively heightened
standard of review than the currently enforced business judgment rule is
necessary. Additionally, to further improve disclosure requirements, this
Article recommends an amendment be made to Item 404 of Schedule 14A to
include interested minority shareholders as one of the parties held to
heightened disclosure requirements.
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INTRODUCTION
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 144 deals with
interested director and officer transactions by laying out three avenues to
protect an interested director transaction from being automatically void or
voidable solely due to a director’s self-interest. Section 144 lists three ways
in which an interested director can protect a transaction, but it does not
explicitly say what happens when an interested director meets the
requirements of the safe harbors. However, certain Delaware cases have
held that once section 144 is satisfied, the court will apply the business
judgment rule. This effect gives substantial deference to the business
judgment of the directors by putting the burden on the plaintiff shareholders
to rebut the presumption by showing that the directors’ actions constituted
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gross negligence.
In addition to interested director transactions, Delaware law regulates
self-dealing transactions of controlling shareholders. However, rather than
apply the business judgment rule standard, as the court has applied when the
requirements of section 144 are met, Delaware courts subject self-dealing
transactions by controlling shareholders to entire fairness review. The entire
fairness standard of review is much more plaintiff-friendly than the business
judgment rule because it requires the defendant, in most cases, to prove that
the transaction was procedurally and substantively fair.1 By requiring the
controlling shareholder to jump over a few more hurdles in proving the
transaction was entirely fair, the standard protects minority shareholders
from being squeezed-out or coerced into a suboptimal or unfair deal.
Though there is regulation for interested director and self-dealing
controlling shareholder transactions, there is no statute that specifically deals
with conflict of interest transactions by minority shareholders. Minority
shareholders must exercise substantial influence over a corporation to be
considered a controller and be subject to entire fairness review. But section
144, and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. (Weinberger) and its progeny, allow
minority shareholders to go substantially unregulated when they engage in
conflict of interest transactions but do not exercise sufficient control over the
corporation to be considered a controller.
The first Section of this Article will evaluate the terms and conditions
of section 144, the problems with the statute, and recommend that the
business judgment rule apply to interested director transactions when
144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2) are satisfied. Additionally, it will recommend that an
interested director transaction be ratified once it satisfies the fairness test
invoked under 144(a)(3). The second Section of this Article will discuss the
seminal case of Weinberger and its progeny, and how the entire fairness
standard of review is applied to self-dealing transactions by both de facto
and de jure controlling shareholders. It will also discuss the implications of
the three-part test suggested by Weinberger that would allow an interested
controlling shareholder transaction to survive entire fairness review. The
paper will discuss the holdings left behind by Weinberger and its progeny
that allow an interested transaction by a controller to be reviewed under
business judgment when the controller: 1) obtains the affirmative approval
of an independent negotiating committee; 2) fully discloses all material
information; and 3) obtains affirmative approval by the majority of minority
shareholders.
1. But see Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (shifting the
standard of review to business judgment when the merger was conditioned on independentdirector negotiations and approval and the approval of a majority of the minority
shareholders).
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This Article will then discuss three approaches that can be taken to
regulate conflict of interest transactions by minority shareholders. It will
also recommend a standard of review that should regulate these transactions
and will conclude by advocating that the subset of interested transactions by
minority shareholders be included under section 144. Finally, this Article
will recommend an increase in disclosure requirements by legislatively
amending Item 404 of Schedule 14A to include interested minority
shareholders..
I.

REGULATING INTERESTED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
UNDER DELAWARE LAW

A. Background on Section 144
Prior to the enactment of Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL)
section 144, interested director transactions could become void or voidable
solely because of a director’s self-interest. The underlying assumption was
that interested directors are unable to act in the best interests of the
corporation’s shareholders when exercising their vote. Upon the realization
that interested director transactions may be advantageous to a corporation,
section 144 was brought into effect.2 The purpose of section 144 was to
allow interested director and officer transactions that pursue advantageous
corporate opportunities to withstand automatic nullification.3 Section 144
operates to allow directors and officers to engage in self-interested
transactions by listing three ways in which a transaction can be “cleansed”
of conflicted interest. The first prong of section 144 enumerates the specific
interested transactions to which it applies. The rest of the statute lists the
safe harbors and the requirements that must be met for those provisions to
effectively protect the interested transaction from being void or voidable.
Therefore, before analyzing the three ways in which section 144 will protect
an interested director transaction, it is important to first determine which
director transactions Delaware corporate law considers to be interested and
2. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J.
CORP. L. 997, 997 (1988) (stating that interested director transactions can be beneficial to a
corporation where “[a] director or senior executive might own a commodity for which there
[is] no good market substitute or might be willing to give better terms than could be obtained
on the market.”).
3. See, e.g., Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d. 150, 185 (Del. Ch.
2005) (satisfying one of the three requirements enumerated in section 144 only means that a
transaction is not void or voidable solely based on the existence of a conflict of interest);
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (indicating that section 144 “merely
removes an ‘interested director’ cloud when its terms are met and provides against
invalidation of an agreement ‘solely’ because such a director or officer is involved.”).
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which of these interested transactions fall within the safeties of 144.
B. Defining Interested Director and Officer Transactions
Under Delaware corporate law, interested director transactions can
encompass several scenarios where a director: usurps a corporate
opportunity; stands on both sides of a transaction; deals with the corporation
itself; or, derives a non-ratable financial benefit.4 A director’s self-interest
can also be implicated where execution of a deal causes the director’s
promotion or hiring by a corporate counterparty in a merger. 5
However, 144 does not apply to the entire range of director selfdealings. Instead, the text of 144(a) states:
(A) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more
of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other
corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in
which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers,
or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this
reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at or
participates in the meeting of the board or committee which
authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because any such
director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such purpose . . .6
The first prong of the statute operates to explicitly limit its application
to transactions where a director or officer is: 1) transacting with the
corporation itself; 2) standing on both sides of the transaction as a director
or officer of the corporation and the entity with which it is transacting; or 3)
where the director has a strong financial interest from which he expects to
derive a personal financial benefit.7 This does not mean that the earlier
discussed examples of interested director transactions are not considered to
be interested under Delaware law. Rather, section 144 will not apply to those
transactions and the deal will remain voidable. Moreover, section 144

4. See Pfeffer v. Redstone, 965 A.2d 676, 690 (Del. 2009) (citing Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (finding that interested transactions exist when a director
operates on both sides of a transaction or derives a financial benefit that is not ratably obtained
by stockholders generally).
5. See Blake Rohrbacher, John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Thomas A. Uebler, Finding Safe
Harbor: Clarifying the Limited Application of Section 144, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L 719, 726
(2008) (explaining that section 144 may not necessarily apply to interested transactions
arising “whe[n] a director approves a merger between the corporation and a third-party bidder
with the hope . . . that the third-party bidder will name the director as the CEO of the surviving
corporation . . . unless the director were found to have a ‘financial interest’ in the acquiring
company.”).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2006).
7. Id.
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applies solely to directors and officers. If a director or officer is not involved
in the deal, then the safe harbors of section 144 will not apply.8 However, if
a director is engaged in a transaction in one of the three circumstances
enumerated in section 144(a), the transaction will not be automatically void
or voidable if it satisfies one of the safe harbors listed. Once a director
engages in an interested transaction, the next step of the analysis requires
assessing the conditions required to satisfy one of the three safe harbors.
1. Analysis of Section 144(a)(1)
The first safe harbor is 144(a)(1), which protects an interested director
transaction from invalidation upon the good faith approval of a majority of
fully informed disinterested directors.9 This section states:
[T]he material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are
known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by
the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors,
even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum.10
This prong bundles together a few requirements that must be satisfied
before the safe harbor will apply. First, the allegedly interested director must
be interested in one of the ways listed in section 144(a).11 Second, the
material facts of the conflict or relationship of the interested director or
officer must be fully disclosed to disinterested directors.12 Third, the
directors reviewing the transaction must qualify as “disinterested.”13 Finally,
the disinterested directors must have acted in good faith when reviewing the
transaction.14
The first part of this test establishes that section 144 will only apply if
the directors are found to be interested in one of the following ways: 1) by
transacting with the corporation itself; 2) by standing on both sides of the
transaction as a director or officer of the corporation and the entity with
which it is transacting; or 3) where the director has a strong financial interest
8. See Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *44 n.39 (Del. Ch. May 24,
2000) (holding that section 144 does not apply because the directors neither sit on both sides
of the potential transaction nor do they have a financial interest in the counterparty
corporation).
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1).
10. Id.
11. See id. (listing interested transactions as those in which the director interacts with the
corporation itself, stands on both sides of the transaction, and has a strong financial interest).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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from which she expects to derive a personal financial benefit.15 Once a
director is interested, the second question is whether the material facts of the
conflict or relationship of the interested director or officer were fully
disclosed to the disinterested directors. Delaware courts have repeatedly
found a fact material when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder, in deciding how to vote, would consider it to be important.16
Therefore, section 144 does not require that an interested director disclose
every detail that led up to the transaction under review.17 Instead, this section
requires that a disinterested director at minimum have all information about
a director’s interest in the transaction that would assume actual significance
in their decision to approve the deal.18
Once the material facts are disclosed to disinterested directors, courts
determine whether the directors reviewing the transaction are, in fact,
disinterested. To be considered disinterested, a director must be able to
exercise his or her own independent business judgment in approving the
transaction.19 “The exercise of discretion and independent judgment implies
that one has authority to make an independent choice, free from immediate
direction or supervision.”20 Additionally, to establish disinterest, directors
should inform themselves of all material information that can reasonably be
obtained before exercising their business judgment.21 In determining
director independence in demand futility cases affected by director conflicts
of interest, courts consider whether the directors are under the control of the

15. Id.; see Pfeffer, 965 A.2d at 690 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)) (concluding that a transaction is interested when a director stands on both sides of the
deal or derives a financial benefit which is not obtained by the stockholders generally). But
see Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 (Del. 1991) (indicating that large share ownership
where self-interest may be involved may not necessarily be enough to create a conflict of
interest among directors where the director with controlling shares does not obtain a financial
benefit which stockholders do not).
16. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710 (Del. 2009).
17. See McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., No. 16963, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *32 (Del.
Ch. May 3, 1999) (finding that a board is not required to disclose “all of the . . . bends and
turns in the road” which led to the final agreement).
18. See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 710 (defining the materiality standard).
19. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1002 (stating that “[a] factually disinterested director
would be one who had no significant relationship of any kind with either the subject matter
of the self-interested transaction, or the director or senior executive who is engaging in the
transaction, that would be likely to affect his judgment.”).
20. Discretion
and
Independent
Judgment,
JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/dictionary/discretion-and-independent-judgment.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 356 (Del. Ch.
1998) (finding that the directors were unable to exercise their independent business judgment
because they reported to and worked under the influence of the chairman of the board who
was interested in the transaction).
21. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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interested directors or have personal interests that would prevent them from
objectively assessing the transaction.22 The requirement that a disinterested
director approve an interested director deal assumes that disinterested
directors can better represent shareholder interests because they have “no
skin in the game.”
Notably, though section 144(a)(1) requires that a majority of
disinterested directors approve an interested transaction, it does not require
that disinterested directors constitute a quorum for their approval to cleanse
a transaction.23 Section 144(b) adds that disinterested directors are not
required to constitute a quorum for board meetings. This additional section
was likely added because approval of self-dealing transactions by
disinterested directors or shareholders originally posed problems for
companies when a majority of the directors had a financial interest in the
deal and so could not count toward satisfying a quorum. Additionally,
Delaware courts have suggested that the approval by the majority of
disinterested directors must be obtained at a formal board meeting for the
safe harbor to apply.24 Section 144(b) therefore appears to relax the quorum
requirement for board meetings to have full legal effect by allowing
interested directors to be included to constitute a quorum.
Finally, section 144(a)(1) requires that courts determine whether the
disinterested directors acted in good faith in approving the transaction. To
make this assessment, courts first determine what counts as approval in good
faith. The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance
§4.01 defines “good faith” where a director acts without a conflict of interest,
exercises well-informed business judgment, and rationally believes that the
business judgment is in the best interest of the corporation.25
A director is also found to have acted in good faith where he or she is
“mindful of their duty to act in the interests of the corporation, and unswayed
by loyalty to the interests of their colleagues . . . .”26 A director or officer
may have failed to act in good faith where he intentionally acts with
motivations other than advancing the best interests of the corporation,
22. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1); Quorum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/quorum/ (last visited March 1, 2018) (“When a committee, board
of directors, meeting of shareholders, legislative or other body of persons cannot act unless a
certain number at least of them are present, that number is called a ‘quorum.’ In the absence
of a rule setting the quorum requirement, a quorum will consist of a majority of those who are
entitled to act.”).
24. See Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1985) (finding that section 144 did
not apply even though the transaction was approved because the approval did not take place
at a formal board meeting).
25. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
26. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 756 n.464 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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violates or intends to violate the law, or demonstrates a conscious disregard
for his duties by failing to act when faced with a known duty to act.27
Additionally, courts find a lack of good faith where an independent or
disinterested director makes a decision without first conducting a reasonable
investigation into the matter.28 A finding of gross negligence would be
required to find that the board of directors breached their duty of good faith.29
2. Analysis of Section 144(a)(2)
If a transaction does not obtain the good faith approval of a majority of
fully informed disinterested directors, directors may seek protection under
section 144(a)(2). Section 144(a)(2) requires that the material facts as to the
director or officer relationship or interest in the transaction be disclosed or
known to the shareholders voting on the transaction.30 It also requires that
the contract or transaction be approved by a good faith vote of the
shareholders.31
This section overlaps with the full disclosure of material facts
requirement in section 144(a)(1). However, section 144(a)(2) mandates
disclosure of material facts to all shareholders entitled to vote on the
transaction. Therefore, under this safe harbor, the transaction is cleansed not
by the approval of disinterested directors exercising their business judgment,
but instead by the majority of shareholders who are entitled to vote on the
transaction.
Information asymmetry arises where a board solicits shareholder
approval to cleanse a transaction and a corporate insider’s knowledge of
corporate deals and their conflicted interests are substantially greater than
that of the corporation’s shareholders. Accordingly, directors have a
fiduciary duty to fairly and fully disclose all material facts before a
shareholder vote commences.32 If shareholders lack the entire scope of
27. Id.
28. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, 958 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding that the
special litigation committee acted in bad faith when their analysis failed to properly
investigate and disclose material facts in their recommendation to dismiss a shareholder
derivative action).
29. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (holding a director liable
for the breach of the duty of care because he was grossly negligent in arranging a merger
transaction); Andersen v. Mattel, Inc., No. 11816-VCMR, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12, at *13
(Del. Ch. 2017) (finding that directors act in bad faith when their actions are motivated by
harm, or taken with indifference to the harm that will result from action or inaction). By
including DGCL §102(b)(7)) in the corporation’s charter, directors have a complete waiver
for acts of negligence or gross negligence. However, §102(b)(7)) does not apply to officers.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2006).
31. Id.
32. “The burden rests on the party relying on stockholder approval to establish that the
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material information surrounding a corporate deal, their votes are deemed to
be uninformed and, consequently, void.33 Therefore, a director’s failure to
disclose all material information regarding their conflict of interest to the
corporation’s shareholders will leave the transaction uncleansed and the safe
harbor will not apply.34
The corporate waste doctrine is another circumstance where the power
of the shareholders to affirm a self-dealing transaction through a majority
vote under section 144(a)(2) is limited.35 Corporate waste occurs when
assets are given away without consideration, or when those assets are
exchanged for something so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the
range at which any reasonable person would be willing to make the trade.
Under the corporate waste doctrine, even a majority vote cannot protect
wildly unbalanced transactions that irrationally dissipate corporate assets.
Only a unanimous shareholder vote can ratify a transaction constituting
corporate waste.36
3.

Analysis of Section 144(a)(3)

The third and final safe harbor that may rescue an interested director
transaction from voidability is section 144(a)(3). To satisfy section
144(a)(3), the interested transaction must be “fair as to the corporation as of
the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a
committee or the stockholders.”37 Even where state law permits interested
director transactions that are ratified by the majority of stockholders or
disinterested directors on the board and the transaction is not ratified, the
transaction will not be voidable if it is intrinsically fair.38

approval resulted from a fully informed electorate and that all material facts relevant to the
transaction were fully disclosed.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1379 (Del. 1996);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Yiannatsis v. Stephanis, Del. Supr.,
653 A.2d 275, 280 (1995); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
33. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
34. See Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1985) (finding that section 144 did
not apply because the approval by a majority of stockholders did not take place after full
disclosure of all material facts regarding the director’s interest in the transaction).
35. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 605 (1962); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904 (1938);
see Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that “[i]n all events,
informed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate
directors have a material conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from
judicial review except on the basis of waste”).
36. See Williams, 671 A.2d at 1380 (finding that a majority of shareholders voting to
approve an interested transaction constitutes ratification except in circumstances of corporate
waste where a unanimous shareholder vote is required).
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3).
38. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 401 (Del. 1987).
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In determining whether a transaction is fair to the corporation, courts
evaluate the procedures of the transaction and the substantive terms of the
deal, much like the common law test for entire fairness. In determining
whether a deal is procedurally fair, courts assess factors such as: when the
transaction was timed; how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, and
disclosed to the directors; and how the director and shareholder approval was
obtained.39 Additionally, a transaction is more likely to be found
procedurally fair if the deal is conducted at arm’s length, using an
independent negotiating committee to review the transaction.40
The inquiry into fair price is more quantitative, focusing on the
economic and financial considerations of the transaction. Such consideration
includes: “assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other
elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of the company’s stock.”41
Though courts—likely for simplicity’s sake—categorize the test for entire
fairness into procedural and substantive evaluations, the test is not
bifurcated. Rather, all issues must be examined on the whole.42
Additionally, the burden for establishing entire fairness is borne by the
corporate fiduciary who stands on both sides of the transaction.43
In 2007, a Delaware Chancery Court attempted to enumerate the
processes it took to determine the entire fairness of an interested director
transaction under section 144(a)(3).
In Valeant Pharmaceutical
International v. Jerney (Valeant), the court applied entire fairness review to
an interested director transaction when the directors failed to obtain approval
by either a majority of disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1) or a
majority of shareholders under section 144(a)(2).44 The transaction involved
an attempt by the company’s former director and president to pay large cash
bonuses to board members.45 Interested members of management initiated
the transaction, and the terms of the payout were not negotiated. Moreover,
everyone involved had an interest in the transaction. Even outside experts
relied on misleading information which was provided to them by a CEO who
stood to gain the most from the deal.46 The court could not find anything
about the process to support a finding of fairness and ultimately held that the
39. 921 A.2d 732, 748 (Del. Ch. 2007).
40. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (holding that the
transaction was not procedurally fair because the interested party failed to deal at arm’s length
through an independent negotiating committee and failed to disclose material information).
41. Oliver v. Bos. Univ., No. 16570-NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *79 (Del. Ch. Apr.
14, 2006) (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
42. Id. at *80 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
43. Valeant, 921 A.2d at 746.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 748.
46. Id.
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bonus payment scheme was not procedurally fair.47
Though the bonus payment plan in Valeant was procedurally unfair, the
court still assessed the fairness of price. The court stated that even when the
processes used to effectuate a deal are unfair, a price that is “so fair” can reel
an interested transaction back within the realm of entire fairness.48 The court
indicated that a transaction that was procedurally unfair can still survive
entire fairness review where the pricing terms of the transaction can be
vindicated by “reference to reliable markets or by comparison to substantial
and dependable precedent transactions.”49 Therefore, reliable markets and
dependable precedent of the company’s transactions are two metrics the
court uses to determine whether a deal is substantively fair.50
The court attempted to evaluate transactional precedent by scrutinizing
the company’s “event bonus” policy.51 Bonuses had been awarded at least
twice in the past in extraordinary circumstances of success.52 However, the
court did not find the current circumstance of a spin-off to be comparatively
extraordinary to warrant another bonus payment.53
Additionally, while courts generally allow directors to exercise their
discretion as to what constitutes a fair price, the “proof of fair price will
generally require a showing that the terms of the transaction fit comfortably
within the narrow range of that discretion, not at its outer boundaries.”54 The
directors in Valeant exercised their broad grant of discretion by valuing the
bonus payment at two-percent of the total value of the spin-off.55 The court
referred to reliable market pricing used by the company’s assumed Initial
Public Offering (IPO) value to determine that the directors abused their
discretion by valuing the bonus payments at an egregiously high price.56
Because the bonus payments were deeply flawed with self-interest and were
valued at a price exceedingly higher than fair market value, the bonus
transaction satisfied neither the procedural nor substantive fairness standards
47. Id. at 736.
48. The court uses a sliding scale approach to determine whether a transaction is entirely
fair. If a transaction is procedurally unfair, a finding of substantive fairness may balance out
the scale enough for the court to find that the transaction satisfies entire fairness review. See
id. at 748 (qualifying that “where the pricing terms of a transaction that is the product of an
unfair process cannot be justified by reference to reliable markets or by comparison to
substantial and dependable precedent transactions, the burden of persuading the court of the
fairness of the terms will be exceptionally difficult.”).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 749.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 749.
55. Id. at 750.
56. Id.
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under section 144(a)(3).
C. Regulating Controlling Shareholder Conflicts of Interest Under
Weinberger
Delaware law also regulates self-dealing transactions involving
controlling shareholders. In these transactions courts apply the entire
fairness standard of review.57 Courts have not applied the business judgment
presumption as the default rule because that standard implies that directors
are fully capable of protecting the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.58 Conversely, conflict of interest transactions between a
director and a corporation lose the presumption that director’s will protect
the interests of others.59
The entire fairness standard operates much like section 144(a)(3) in that
it requires a finding of fair process and fair price before a transaction can be
ratified. Notably, the existence of a controlling shareholder does not
automatically require entire fairness review. 60 Rather, transactions where a
controlling shareholder engages in self-dealing trigger this higher threshold
of judicial scrutiny.
In the seminal case Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. (Weinberger),
Weinberger, a former minority shareholder of UOP, brought a class action
suit against UOP, requesting rescission of a cash-out merger between UOP,
Inc. (UOP) and Signal, Inc. (Signal) which Weinberger claimed was unfair.61
The court automatically applied the entire fairness standard to the proposed
merger between UOP and Signal because Signal was an interested
controlling shareholder standing on both sides of the deal as a buyer and
seller of UOP.62
Signal became a controlling shareholder of UOP when it acquired
50.5% of UOP’s outstanding stock, while the other 49.5% was owned by
retail investors.63 Signal was also operating on both sides of the transaction
because Signal elected six out of the thirteen members sitting on UOP’s
57. 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107,
110 (Del. 1952).
58. Donald E. Schwartz, Delaware General Corporation Law - A Commentary and
Analysis, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 628 (1973).
59. Id.
60. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (applying the
business judgment rule where action taken by a controlling shareholder did not constitute selfdealing and affected all shareholders proportionately).
61. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
62. Id. at 710.
63. Id. at 704.
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board, five of which were either directors or employees of Signal.64 A
conflict of interest existed because Signal was attempting to purchase the
remaining 49.5% of UOP stock while at the same time representing the
corporation in the sale of the company as a majority shareholder.65 In
applying the entire fairness standard the court ultimately held that the merger
was unfair because UOP failed to disclose material information to its
shareholders and outside directors that a price in excess of what Signal
ultimately offered would have been reasonable for Signal to pay for the
outstanding shares of UOP.66
In controlling shareholder transactions, section 144 is inapplicable
because the statute solely applies to interested transactions involving
directors and officers. In Weinberger, it was Signal, the controlling
shareholder, making the decisions. However, because Signal elected some
of its directors to the board of UOP, UOP did have interested directors in
addition to an interested controlling shareholder. But the court focused on
the controlling shareholder element here because the directors of UOP were
acting under the control of Signal. Therefore, the outcome of Weinberger
suggests that once a controlling shareholder is involved, the corporation can
satisfy the following three conditions to fulfill their burden of proving that a
transaction is entirely fair.67 The corporation with the interested controlling
shareholder must: 1) set up an independent negotiating committee to
negotiate on behalf of the corporation against the majority shareholder; 2)
fully disclose all material information; and 3) have the transaction approved
by a majority of the minority shareholders. Weinberger indicates that if these
three elements are not satisfied, the transaction will fail the entire fairness
standard of review.68
The common law entire fairness standard seen in Weinberger is similar
to the aforementioned fairness test elicited under section 144(a)(3) in that the
test is composed of two concepts: fair dealing and fair price.69 Fair dealing

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 710.
67. When the merger is conditioned upon the approval of a “majority of the minority”
stockholder vote, and approval is obtained, the standard of review remains entire fairness, but
the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was unfair. Kahn v.
Lynch Comm. Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (1994); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929,
937-38 (1985); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
68. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (finding that defendants failed to set up an adequate
independent negotiating committee and failed to fully disclose all material information to
shareholders before subjecting them to a vote on the transaction).
69. “The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized,
approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the stockholders.” DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2006).
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involves the timing, initiation, negotiation, and structure of the transaction.70
Alternatively, fair price deals with economic and financial considerations,
including: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, or any other
elements that affect the inherent value of a company’s stock.71
In Weinberger, the court first suggests that to survive entire fairness
review, UOP needed to set up an independent negotiating committee that
would deal with Signal, the controlling shareholder, at arm’s length.72
However, UOP failed to set up an adequate independent negotiating
committee to negotiate on its behalf with the controlling shareholder and
instead had UOP’s CEO, a long-time standing employee of Signal, negotiate
the merger on behalf of UOP.73 Had UOP created an independent negotiating
committee to deal at arm’s length with Signal, the result here may have been
different.74
Additionally, both UOP and Signal, as the controlling shareholder,
failed to fully disclose all material facts of the transaction to the minority
shareholders of UOP.75 In attempting to acquire UOP through a merger,
Signal instructed two employees, who also sat on the board of UOP, to
conduct a feasibility study assessing the possibility of acquiring the
remaining 49.5% of UOP’s shares.76 In the feasibility study, these two
employees concluded that Signal would make a beneficial investment if
Signal paid any price up to $24 per share to acquire the remaining 49.5% of
UOP’s shares.77 Signal, however, never disclosed this report to the
shareholders of UOP.78 Instead, Signal proposed to pay $21 per share as fair
value even though the feasibility report quoted that a price of $24 per share
was reasonable for UOP to request.79 This price differential led to a loss of
nearly $17 million for the minority shareholders of UOP.
Furthermore, the CEO of UOP retained Lehman Brothers to render a
fairness opinion as to the $21 per share price offered to the minority
shareholders.80 Lehman Brothers only had three business days to assess the
70. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
71. In Weinberger the court discards the Delaware block method for determining value
and instead allows proof of value using any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community. Id. at 713.
72. Id. at 711.
73. Id. at 705.
74. See Harriman v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 142 (Del. 1975)
(creating a special negotiating committee substantiated the courts finding of procedural
fairness through arm’s length negotiations).
75. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 707.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 706.
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fairness of the offer price, ultimately concluding that the $21 per share offer
was a fair value.81 However, neither the UOP shareholders nor UOP’s
outside directors were fully informed of the quick speed at which this
valuation was conducted.82 Therefore, UOP, along with Signal as the
controlling shareholder, failed to disclose all information to UOP’s
shareholders in two material respects that would have undoubtedly altered
their voting decision.
Finally, although UOP managed to obtain approval from the majority
of the minority shareholders, the court found the vote to be invalid as the
shareholders did not have all material information disclosed to them in order
to make a fully informed vote on the merger transaction.83 The court found
the merger transaction to be unfair and found Signal to have breached its
fiduciary duty of fair dealing with the minority shareholders.84
The court in Weinberger indicated three ways in which an interested
transaction by a controlling shareholder can survive entire fairness review.
However, because these steps were not satisfied, the transaction in
Weinberger failed entire fairness review.85 Therefore, the court never
elaborated on what happens if the corporation satisfies all three
requirements.
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Delaware shed some light on what
happens when the three prongs of Weinberger are satisfied. In Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp. (M&F Worldwide), controlling shareholder MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. (MF) orchestrated a going private merger with M&F
Worldwide Corp. (MFW), a holding company.86 Because the merger
transaction involved an interested controlling shareholder, the deal should
have been subject to entire fairness review, as in Weinberger. However, the
Supreme Court applied a new standard, consistent with Weinberger and its
progeny, that allowed the interested transaction by MF, the controlling
shareholder, to be reviewed under the business judgment rule. The court
held that rather than apply the entire fairness standard, the business judgment
rule will be the appropriate standard of review if, but only if, several steps
81. Id. There is no specified amount of time that is required for fairness opinions to be
legitimate. However, courts generally apply a reasonableness standard to investment banks,
particularly looking for facts that indicate the bank did more than just “rubber stamp” the
fairness opinion. Fairness Opinions: Liability Issues an Investment Bank Should Consider –
Part One, Bloomberg Law Reports — Corporate and M&A Law (BNA) Vol. 5, No. 23 (2011),
https://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub4356_1.pdf.
82. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 708.
83. Id. at 703.
84. See id. at 709 (stating that majority shareholders have a duty to deal fairly with
minority shareholders).
85. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 702.
86. 88 A.3d 635, 638 (Del. 2014).
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are taken: 1) the procession of the transaction depends “ab initio” on
approval by both a special committee and a majority of the minority
shareholders; 2) the special committee is independent; 3) the special
committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to definitively
say no; 4) the special committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair
price; 5) the vote of the minority is informed; and 6) there is no coercion of
the minority shareholders.87
Although the M&F Worldwide decision lists six factors, these six
factors can be collapsed into three requirements that mirror the roadmap
enumerated in Weinberger: full disclosure, majority of the minority
approval, and an independent negotiating committee. Because MF
preconditioned the merger on the approval of both a fully informed and
adequately empowered independent special committee, and an informed and
uncoerced vote of the majority of the minority stockholders, the business
judgment rule applied.88 The court states that M&F Worldwide is consistent
with Weinberger, Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc. (Kahn v.
Lynch), and their progeny.89 Therefore, unless both procedural protections
for the minority stockholders are established prior to trial, the appropriate
judicial standard of review would continue to be entire fairness, with the
possible shift in the burden of proof.90 Other cases lend further credence to
this supposition. The court in In re Cox Communications, Inc. (In re Cox)
held that business judgment review was proper when a freeze-out merger
was: 1) approved by an independent committee; and 2) conditioned on
approval by “a majority of the minority stockholders”.91 If not, or if there is
doubt about one of the requirements, the appropriate standard is entire
fairness.92 Additionally, In re CNX Gas Corporation Shareholders
Litigation (In re CNX) establishes that the business judgment rule will apply
once a two-step tender offer freeze-out transaction satisfies the three
safeguarding minority shareholder conditions: full disclosure, independent
negotiating committee, and the majority of the minority shareholder
approval.93 Therefore, in applying M&F Worldwide to Weinberger, the
standard of review would have shifted from entire fairness to business
judgment if the controlling shareholder, UOP, had created an adequate and
87. Id. at 639.
88. Id. at 638.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 646; see Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (shifting
the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove the transaction was not entirely fair after the
transaction have been approved by an independent committee of directors or an informed
majority of the minority shareholders).
91. 879 A.2d 604, 606 (Del. Ch. 2005).
92. Id.
93. 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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independent special committee and fully disclosed all material information
to its shareholders before the majority of the minority voted to approve the
transaction.
Finally, in a recent Delaware Chancery Court case, In re EZCORP Inc.
Consulting Agreement Derivative Litigation (In re EZCORP), a shareholder
brought a derivative suit against the board of directors on a breach of
fiduciary duty claim and against the controlling shareholder on aiding and
abetting the director defendants in breaching their fiduciary duties.94 The
controlling shareholder, Cohen, was a minority shareholder with high-vote
shares which gave him control over EZCORP while owning only 5.5% of
the company’s equity.95 Cohen engaged in conflict of interest transactions
as a controlling shareholder by receiving a non-ratable benefit in the form of
EZCORP’s long history of advisory service agreements with entities
affiliated with Cohen, and Cohen’s incentive to obtain returns at the expense
of paying out dividends.96 The court found the appropriate standard of
review in conflict of interest transactions by a controlling shareholder to be
the business judgment rule when the controller agrees up front that the
transaction will not go forward unless it is conditioned upon both 1) the
affirmative recommendation of an independent negotiating committee; and
2) the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority shareholders unaffiliated
with the controller.97 This case, along with the those prior mentioned,
reiterates and solidifies Weinberger’s roadmap to lowering the standard of
review to business judgment when an interested controlling shareholder is
involved.
In comparison to the business judgment rule, often invoked once section
144 is satisfied,98 an increased level of scrutiny is applied to interested
transactions by controlling shareholders. The Weinberger three-step test
requires that all three factors be satisfied — the independent negotiating
committee, full disclosure, and the majority of the minority shareholder
approval — for the transaction to survive entire fairness review. Compare
this with interested director transactions under 144 where a director only
must satisfy one of the three listed requirements, not all three, before the
business judgment rule will apply.99
The requirement that corporations with interested controlling
94. No. 9962-VCL WL 301245, at *22 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016).
95. Id. at *5.
96. Id. at *97.
97. Id. at *33.
98. See Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *44 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000)
(applying the business judgment rule standard of review when section 144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2)
has been satisfied and the director or officer is not the majority shareholder).
99. The statute does not indicate that the business judgment rule automatically applies,
however, courts often find this to be the appropriate standard once 144 is satisfied. Id.
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shareholders jump over more hurdles to receive the deferential business
judgment review reflects a policy attempt to protect minority shareholders.
When a controlling shareholder is involved in a transaction, directors and
officers of the corporation may be pressured or coerced to act in favor of the
controlling shareholder and against the best interests of the corporation.
Entire fairness is a substitute for the dual protections of a disinterested board
and shareholder approval because either can be undermined by the influence
of the controller.100 By requiring arm’s length negotiations through an
independent negotiating committee, full disclosure, and approval by a
majority of minority shareholders, the court prevents coercion and
manipulation from clouding the judgment of the corporate entity.
II.

RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITIES IN THE CURRENT REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK

A. Resolving the ambiguities in DGCL 144
Assessing the ways in which courts have interpreted and applied the
provisions of section 144 highlights the many imperfections of the statute.
First, section 144 appears to omit important words that courts have
subsequently interpreted into the statute, begging the question whether these
additions were within the legislators’ original intent. Second, the statute
leaves unanswered what happens once an interested director satisfies one of
the three safe harbors. Is the transaction ratified? Is it subject to additional
judicial scrutiny? If it is still to be subjected to judicial scrutiny, which
standard or test should apply?
Though Delaware law generally attempts to create enabling and
descriptive statutes rather than prescriptive statutes, the ambiguity of section
144 has courts struggling to give it a clear meaning and straightforward
application. Therefore, a vague enabling statute should not be left vague for
judges to project and entertain their subjective interpretations, as this leads
to inconsistent judicial rulings and unpredictability for corporate directors.
Instead, these problems should be addressed and resolved to more narrowly
tailor the statute and facilitate more consistent adjudication.
1. Clarifying the Ambiguities in 144(a)(1)
The first ambiguity of the statute is found in section 144(a)(1). Section
144(a)(1) is a safe harbor for interested director transactions that protects the
statute from voidability with approval by a majority of fully informed
100. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
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disinterested directors acting in good faith.101 However, if a corporation has
only one disinterested director, will a corporation be able to use section
144(a)(1) to cleanse an interested director transaction? Or, is more than one
independent director required at all times. The statute is unclear on this
point. However, in In re CNX , a sole independent director negotiated on
behalf of CNX with the controlling shareholder, Consol, who was attempting
a two-step merger freeze-out.102 Though this case did not involve an
interested director and therefore did not invoke section 144, the case may
imply how the uncertainty in section 144(a)(1) should be interpreted. If an
independent director is qualified in the eyes of the court to impartially
negotiate on behalf of the corporation, a sole disinterested director should
also be able to cleanse an interested director transaction under section
144(a)(1).103
2. Clarifying the Ambiguities in 144(a)(2)
As discussed earlier, section 144(a)(2) protects interested director
transactions from voidability when a fully informed majority shareholder
vote approves the deal. 104 The statute explicitly requires that shareholders be
fully informed of all material information regarding the director’s interests
in a transaction and that they approve the transaction in good faith.105 The
statute does not explicitly state the threshold voting requirement for
shareholder approval. However, courts have read the statute to require
approval from a majority of disinterested shareholders in order to satisfy the
threshold.106
Shareholder disinterest would consist of the fully informed uncoerced
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2006).
102. Consol was the controlling shareholder of CNX Gas, owning 83.5% of CNX stock.
In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 401 (Del. Ch. 2010).
103. Id. An independent director is not synonymous with a disinterested director. The
two terms overlap substantially but are not identical. An independent director is always
disinterested; however, a disinterested director may not always be independent. “The term
‘independent director’ means a director who does not have employment, family, or other
significant economic or personal connections to the corporation other than serving as a
director. It is often used interchangeably with the term ‘disinterested director,’ which means
a director who, for purposes of voting on a specific transaction or arrangement with the
corporation, does not have an economic or personal interest in that transaction or
arrangement.” Bruce Davis, Director Independence and Corporate Governance, BUSINESS
LAW
TODAY
(2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2010/11/training_tomorrow.html.
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2006).
105. Id.
106. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952) (stating that “the
entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules invoked where formal approval has been
given by a majority of independent, fully informed stockholders.”).
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vote of the majority of shareholders entitled to vote.107 While the safe harbor
provision does not statutorily require approval by a majority of the
disinterested shareholders, Delaware courts interpreting section 144(a)(2)
have concluded that the condition is implicit in the requirement that
shareholders vote to approve the transaction in good faith.108
In Lewis v. Vogelstein, Mattel Inc. (Mattel) adopted a stock
compensation plan for its outside directors which entitled the directors to a
one-time option grant of 15,000 shares of Mattel common stock.109 The
compensation plan was ratified by a shareholder vote, and a shareholder suit
was brought by Harry Lewis on a breach of fiduciary duty claim.110 The
court held that “[i]n all events, informed, uncoerced, disinterested
shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate directors have a
material conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from
judicial review except on the basis of waste.”111 The court read disinterest
into the statute by invalidating the shareholder vote because nearly twothirds of the shareholders were interested in the transaction.112 Reading the
statute in this way exacerbates the power of minority votes and protects
against the circumstance where a majority of the shares are held by interested
directors. Courts are focused on excluding conflicted or interested voting
and ensuring that a neutral party decides whether to approve the deal.113 As
the court stated in Oberly v. Kirby, “[t]he key to upholding an interested
transaction is the approval of some neutral decision-making body.”114
Ratification by disinterested shareholders is also an important requirement
due to the complications involved with shareholder voting, such as:
collective voting, cross-holdings, vote-buying, uninformed voting, and

107. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335 (Del. Ch. 1997) (finding that a
shareholder vote would be invalid if the majority of the shareholders who ratified the
transaction had conflicted interests).
108. Cement Masons Local 780 Pension Fund v. Schleifer, 61 N.Y.S.3d 190 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2017); see also In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 615 n.19 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (indicating that “[t]he reference to the approval of stockholders being made in
‘good faith’ in [section] 144(a)(2) might be read as imposing a requirement on an interested
party to the transaction that its approving vote as a stockholder to refrain from using its voting
power to push through a transaction unfair to the corporation and correspondingly
overgenerous to the interested party.”).
109. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 329.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 336.
112. See id. (requiring approval by disinterested shareholders to ratify an interested
director transaction).
113. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976) (finding that section
144(a)(2) warrants a reading of “disinterest” due to circumstances where a majority of the
shares that voted to approve the transaction were owned by interested directors).
114. 592 A.2d 445, 466-67 (Del. 1991).
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controlling shareholders.115 Shareholders are not homogenous. Instead, they
have competing interests and diverging views on what wealth maximization
looks like.116
The Delaware legislature wanted to emphasize the importance of good
faith and fair dealing, specifically including the phrase “good faith” as a
requirement of section 144(a)(2).117 This intent can only be effectuated when
the vote disqualifies interested votes. Therefore, the statute should be
amended to explicitly allow for an interested director transaction to be
cleansed only when it has been ratified by a majority of “disinterested”
shareholders. Although Delaware courts already read this language into the
statute, by going one step further and including it in the text, the legislature
can better effectuate its legislative intent. This amendment will also provide
more clarity and predictability for corporate directors and more consistent
adjudication.
3. Applying a Standard of Review
Finally, courts diverge as to what happens when a transaction satisfies
the requirements of section 144 because the statute fails to prescribe the
standard of review that should apply upon compliance with its safe harbors.
The crux of the dispute is whether an interested director transaction that
satisfies section 144 should then be subject to the business judgment rule or
entire fairness review. The original purpose and explicit language of section
144 indicates that the statute operates merely to shelter interested
transactions from being void solely because of the director’s lack of
impartiality.
Contrary to the Chancery Court’s finding in Lewis v. Vogelstein, the
statute fails to protect the transaction from any further judicial scrutiny once
the safe harbors of sections 144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2) are satisfied.118 Professor
115. See Grant M. Hayden and Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 499-500 (2008),
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1166&context=facult
y_scholarship (discussing the lack of homogeneity among shareholders due to the diverging
interests between minority shareholders and “majority shareholders, shareholders with
disproportionate voting rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged
shareholders, sovereign wealth funds, and employee and management shareholders.”).
116. Id. at 500.
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2006).
118. See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 329 (holding that “[i]n all events, informed, uncoerced,
disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate directors have a
material conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from judicial review
except on the basis of waste.”); Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 222 (Del. 1976) (rejecting defendant’s
argument for broad immunity under 144 and stating that nothing in the statute completely
removes an interested director transaction from judicial scrutiny).
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Ernest Folk, in his commentary and analysis of section 144, notes that, “[t]he
validating effect does not go beyond removing the spectre of
voidability . . . .”119 But it should. The high approval threshold required by
section 144 indicates that the statue should do more than simply protect the
transaction from voidability. In fact, courts have held that, absent a finding
of corporate waste, satisfying the requirements of section 144 should invoke
the business judgment rule standard of review.120
In Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc. (Benihana), the court
applied the business judgment rule after an interested director transaction
received the approval of disinterested directors under 144(a)(1). 121 The court
found business judgment to be the appropriate standard of review because
the board possessed all material information on the transaction that was
sufficient to render a neutral and untainted approval.122 Additionally, the
court in Marciano v. Nakash further added that “approval by fully-informed
disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested stockholders
under section 144(a)(2), permits invocation of the business judgment
rule.”123 The court here applied the business judgment rule because evidence
showed that the self-dealing transaction was a legitimate and beneficial deal
for the corporation.124
Case law clearly indicates that once sections 144(a)(1) or 144(a)(2) are
complied with, the transaction shall be reviewed under the business
judgement rule. This is the appropriate result that should follow. But,
further, section 144 should be amended to include explicit language stating
that the business judgment rule will apply once section 144 is satisfied. This
amendment would result in more certainty and predictability in corporate
transactions.
Some commentators argue that satisfying the safe harbors of section

119. Rohrbacher, supra note 5, at 724 (citing Ernest L. Folk, II, in THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 82 (2d. 1972).
120. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006); Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400,
405 n.3 (Del. 1987).
121. See Benihana, 906 A.2d at 120 (finding that once the transaction receives the
approval of disinterested directors, the court will apply the business judgment rule in
reviewing the transaction); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating
that the business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision, the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”).
122. Benihana, 906 A.2d at 121; see also Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 366 n.34 (holding that
the three safe harbors of section 144 operate to remove the “interested director cloud” and
bring the transaction within the review of business judgment).
123. Marciano, 535 A.2d at 405.
124. Id. at 401.
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144 can still subject a transaction to the entire fairness standard of review.125
Stating that section 144 was originally created for the sole purpose of
protecting an interested director transaction from voidability and therefore
has a very narrow, limited scope.126 As Delaware Supreme Court Justice
Moore stated in his Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. (Unocal) opinion,
“[O]ur corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in response to,
indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs. Merely because the
[Delaware] General Corporation Law is silent as to a specific matter does
not mean that it is prohibited.”127 Recent case law, discussed above, has
adapted to evolving concepts in applying the business judgment rule once
sections 144(a)(1) and 144(a)(2) are satisfied. The landscape of corporate
law has changed since the enactment of section 144 in 1967, suggesting that
there is no need to narrowly construe section 144 solely because it is
consistent with its original purpose.
Additionally, business judgment should apply because section 144’s
safe harbors exhaustively remove the taint of director interest from a
transaction. Entire fairness review is intended to act as a substitute for the
dual protections of a disinterested board and shareholder approval because
both can be undermined by the influence of an interested controlling party.128
However, these dual protections are not necessary in the case of interested
director transactions. The good faith approval of a majority of disinterested
directors effectively removes the interested director from the decisionmaking role. Therefore, section 144(a)(1) alone, through the requirement of
good faith, full disclosure, and approval by a majority of disinterested
directors, ensures a fair assessment of what is best for the corporation and its
shareholders. The interested director does not have effective control over
the disinterested directors, which would be necessary to undermine this
requirement.
The same is true for section 144(a)(2). The requirement that a majority
of disinterested directors approve an interested transaction should satisfy
courts that the transaction was free of coercion and director interest. Because
the interested director cannot control the votes of the corporation’s
shareholders, the vote is presumed to be free of director self-interest.
Additionally, even if a director owns a substantial amount of the
corporation’s outstanding shares, he or she will not be able to vote those
shares in attempting to satisfy section 144(a)(2). Delaware law effectively
125. See Rohrbacher, supra note 5, at 744 (stating that section 144 does not have an
impact on whether the interested transaction will be subject to entire fairness review or the
business judgment rule).
126. Id. at 746-47.
127. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985).
128. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
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strips the interested director from voting their shares in two ways. First, the
courts have continuously interpreted section 144 to require that a majority of
disinterested shareholders approve the transaction. Second, the explicit
language of the text requires that the majority of shareholders approve the
transaction in good faith. If any number of interested director shares are used
to meet the majority approval threshold, the approval fails to satisfy the
necessary good faith requirement. Therefore, if a transaction is free of
suspicion and self-interest, the statute should lower the standard of review to
business judgement.
Alternatively, under section 144(a)(3) there should be no additional
judicial scrutiny applied to a transaction that satisfies the requirements for
entire fairness. The conditions of section 144(a)(3) require that an interested
director carry the burden of proving that “[t]he contract or transaction is fair
as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by
the board of directors, a committee or the stockholders.”129 Therefore, a nondisclosing interested director can remove the cloud of interest from a
transaction by proving the entire fairness of the deal.130 The burden that the
interested director carries would appear to be the same under section
144(a)(3), as under prior case law, of proving the entire fairness of a
questioned transaction which had been approved or ratified by the directors
or shareholders.131
These amendments to section 144 would clarify the statute and allow
for more accurate and uniform judicial decision-making. These changes may
even deter many unwarranted challenges to interested director transactions
through the certainty of a clear statutory intent. Furthermore, the
amendments would allow for more predictability in corporate decisionmaking by providing directors and officers with a clear roadmap on how to
successfully structure and cleanse an interested transaction.
When comparing the tests applied by Delaware courts to interested
party transactions, one can gain perspective into the substantial overlap
between the two. Specifically, the Weinberger test is nearly a mirror image
of the test laid out in section 144. Both tests try to simulate both arm’s length
negotiations in interested transactions and the uncoerced and fully informed
approval by a majority of the minority shareholders. The main difference is
that Weinberger requires all three prongs to be satisfied before the business
judgment rule will apply, whereas section 144 requires satisfying only one
of three provisions to lower the standard of judicial scrutiny.
The requirement that controlling shareholders, and not directors, jump
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2006).
130. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
144(a)(2) (2006).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2006); Rohrbacher, supra note 5, at 725.
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through all three hoops to receive deferential review suggests that conflicting
shareholder incentives call into question the effectiveness of gaining the
approval of the majority of the minority shareholders. This is an accurate
suspicion as interested controlling shareholders may compromise corporate
decision-making to a greater extent than do interested directors or officers.
For example, controlling shareholders may occupy a uniquely advantageous
position through their ability to elect directors. This may cause current
directors to feel pressure to conform to keep their seat on the company’s
board. There is also the fear that independent directors feel a stronger
allegiance to a controller, rather than to the corporation and its public
stockholders. Therefore, when a controlling shareholder is involved, courts
require the controller to condition the procession of the transaction on the
approval by a special committee, full disclosure, and a majority of minority
stockholders vote to obtain business judgment review.
However, Weinberger and section 144 both leave behind a substantial
ambiguity: what standard of review should apply to interested transactions
by minority shareholders, particularly minority activist hedge funds. Section
144 does not include minority shareholders within its regulation, as it
explicitly applies to interested director and officer transactions.
Additionally, the Weinberger roadmap applies solely to controlling
shareholders and does not suggest what standard should apply when minority
shareholders engage in interested transactions.
III.

REGULATING INTERESTED MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS

A. Background on Minority Shareholders
Section 144 and the Weinberger roadmap facilitate regulation of
interested party transactions under Delaware law. However, these two
regulatory frameworks fail to regulate any interested transactions by
individuals who are neither directors nor officers nor controlling
shareholders of a corporation. The Delaware code and case law remain silent
on the issue of regulating conflict of interest transactions by minority
shareholders. The lack of regulation for interested minority shareholder
transactions may be due to the assumption that minority shareholders are
powerless. However, minority shareholders are not powerless. The current
decrease in stock ownership by retail investors and the increase in shares
held by institutions has led to a substantial increase in the voting power of
minority shareholders.132 In fact, activist investors and hedge funds are
132. See SULLIVAN

AND

CROMWELL, 2016 U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM REVIEW

AND
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among the most influential minority shareholders.
Activist hedge funds and investors such as Carl Icahn, Bill Ackman,
and Nelson Peltz may not have direct and sufficient control over the board
of directors to the extent that they would be considered a controller under
contemporary law, nor do they own more than 50% of the corporation’s
stock.133 However, minority activist shareholders can still put persuasive
pressure on the board to act in ways most favorable to the fund’s position.
Activist investors have increasingly pressured managers into pursuing
corporate transactions varying from the issuance of dividends, share
repurchases, the sale of assets, or the sale of the entire corporation.134 In
many instances, activist investors, as minority shareholders, uniquely benefit
from these transactions.135 It is questionable whether this benefit is at the
expense of the long-term value of the firm and its shareholders, and whether
the market should consider minority shareholder activists to be controllers.
The current market approach is that a 5% ownership stake is a sufficient
threshold for minority shareholders to be able to exert sufficient influence
over a board to be considered a controller.136 This threshold is also consistent
with the filing of Schedule 13D with the SEC which is required when a
person or persons obtain the beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a
voting class of a company’s registered stock, and are holding the stock with
non-passive intent.137 Under Schedule 13D Item 6, if a minority shareholder
accumulates 5% of beneficial stock ownership, the shareholder is required to
disclose any “contracts, arrangements, [or] understandings . . . with respect
to any securities” of the company.138 Additionally, under Item 4, the
minority shareholder would be required to indicate its true intents and
ANALYSIS
3
(2016),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2016_U.S._Shareholder_
Activism_Review_and_Analysis.pdf [hereinafter Sullivan and Cromwell] (highlighting the
higher level of voter participation by institutional investors over retail investors with only
28% of retail-held shares voted compared to 91% of institutional owned shares voted in 2016).
133. “Activist shareholder defines an individual investor or institutional investor, such as
an activist hedge fund, that purchases a non-controlling minority stake of the voting class of
a public company’s equity securities to effect changes within the target company. Activist
investors do not own, control or manage the corporations in which they invest. Instead, they
rely on the support of institutional investors and pension funds to exert influence and exercise
their shareholder rights.” Activist Investor Definition, CARRIED INTEREST,
https://www.carriedin.com/activist-investor/.
134. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STANFORD L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2008).
135. Id.
136. J.P. Morgan, The Activist Revolution: Understanding and Navigating a New World
of
Heightened
Investor
Scrutiny,
6
(2015),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320693986586.pdf.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(d)–101 (2017).
138. Id.
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purposes in accumulating the stock.139
However, the disclosure of hedging short positions, and positions in a
proposed merger counterparty, are not explicitly required.140 It is often the
case that activist hedge funds own less than 7%.141 Activist hedge funds have
even shown to be effective while owning 1% or less of shares outstanding
and would therefore not be required to file Schedule 13D.142 Because activist
hedge funds cannot directly control the vote of the corporation, they instead
exert control through threats of a proxy fight or aggressive public relations
campaigns generally directed at the board of the target corporation.143
Activist hedge funds also engage in other shareholder campaigns, including:
“publicly disclosing letters to target companies, issuing press releases,
proposing precatory or binding shareholder proposals, running ‘vote no’
campaigns against incumbent directors, calling special meetings or taking
actions by written consent.”144 Activist shareholders such as Icahn, Ackman,
and Peltz also put pressure on the board of directors through stock
accumulation, shareholder proposals, public communications, proxy contest
solicitation, and unsolicited offers and takeovers.
Activist minority shareholders can engage in various forms of interested
transactions. First, activist shareholders and institutions are focused on profit
maximization and short swing profits. Therefore, activist shareholders can
buy a block of common stock in the target corporation and vote the shares
while at the same time hedging away economic interest in the stock through
derivatives contracts.145 Second, activist shareholders can take a negative
economic position in the firm by shorting its stock and then profiting by
advocating for changes that will drive down the stock price.146 The effect of
139. Thomas W. Briggs, Conflicts of Interest and Full Disclosure, 32 J. OF CORP. L. 701
(2007),
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=LT&u=nellco_penn&id=GALE|A167030885&v=2.1&it
=r&sid=LT&asid=6ec3fc1b.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see also Sullivan and Cromwell, supra note 132, at 2 (finding that in ownership
campaigns launched in 2015, the median percentage ownership of the activist group was less
than 7%, and for companies with a market cap of $20 billion, ownership was less than 3%).
142. See J.P. Morgan, supra note 136, at 7 (indicating that sixty percent of campaigns that
target $25 billion-plus market cap companies are initiated by activists who own less than a
1% stake in the corporation).
143. Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors,
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (January 26, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-otheractivist-investors/. See also Sullivan and Cromwell, supra note 132, at 6 (finding that
companies which launch activist campaigns generally do not hold enough stock to play a
direct and determinative role in voting).
144. Sullivan and Cromwell, supra note 132, at 15.
145. Anabtawi, supra note 134, at 1258.
146. Id.
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these actions is negative and results in the separation of voting rights and
economic interests. Hedge funds can also engage in an interested transaction
with the director of the target corporation as a principal of the hedge fund.
Finally, activist shareholders can be interested in merger transactions when
they are transacting as both a target shareholder and the bidder.
Shareholder advocates argue that activist shareholders, by targeting
weak companies and curing corporate governance inefficiencies, maximize
value by giving voice to minority shareholders who are not as able to use
their governance rights to control problems within the corporation.147 They
are of the view that activist shareholders generally increase efficiency in
corporate governance by replacing CEO’s and board members, or by
correcting underperformance occurring through the target corporation’s
misuse of free cash flows.148
Conversely, commentators defending the centrality of the board of
directors take the position that “hedge funds are impatient investors, whose
interventions are directed at boosting a target’s short-term stock price,
potentially at the expense of long-term value creation, rather than at bringing
about increased managerial accountability.”149 They criticize hedge funds
for too readily jumping into the internal functioning of a corporation when
there is a decline in short-term earnings before knowing whether this decline
is the result of a long-term value maximizing investment that hasn’t paid off
yet or poor management.150
However, a study conducted by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei
Jiang documents evidence of the lack of short-term gains at the expense of
long-term value maximization in activist hedge fund campaigns. Using a
dataset of approximately 2,000 activist hedge fund interventions between
1994–2007, they found that on average, the operating and stock performance
of target corporations continued to increase even five years after the start of
the hedge fund activism.151 The study also found that in the instances of
interventions that constrain long-term investments by increasing leverage,
reducing investments, and adversarial interventions employing hostile
tactics, improvements in operating performance followed during the five147. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds and
the Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2016).
148. Alessio M. Pacces, Hedge Fund Activism as a Conflict of Entrepreneurship, CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 22, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/02/22/hedge-fundactivism-as-a-conflict-of-entrepreneurship/.
149. Cremers, supra note 147, at 264.
150. Id. at 265.
151. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
COLUM.
L.
REV.
1085,
1094-95
(2015),
Activism,
115
https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/financialstudies/sites/financialstudies/files/files/Jiang_Long
-term%20effects%20of%20hedge%20fund%20activisim.pdf.
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year period after the intervention.152 They also failed to find adverse longterm effects asserted by the opponents of hedge fund activism.
Additionally, in 2015 and 2016, the potential consequences of
shareholder activism on the long-term firm value was brought to the attention
of a number of large institutional investors.153 In fact, in 2015, “BlackRock
sent letters to CEOs of large-cap companies urging them not to take shortterm actions, such as buybacks and increased dividends, that may satisfy the
demands of short-term activists but that impair long-term value.”154
Additionally, in 2016 BlackRock sent more letters urging companies to
devise a strategy for creating long-term firm value to counter activist
demands for actions prioritizing short-term benefits.155
Additionally, interested activist hedge funds acting as both bidder and
stockholder have beneficial effects for corporations in the merger context.
The existence of an activist hedge fund can decrease frictions associated with
the entrenchment of management.156 Additionally, target managers may
prioritize self-interested gains over shareholder gains in mergers.157
Therefore, by threatening to replace target management, activist funds can
decrease the likelihood of this type of self-dealing and allow shareholders to
receive higher premiums in merger transactions.158
However, a negative implication of involving interested activist hedge
funds in a merger transaction is that the average takeover premium offered
by activist bidders is 22.5% lower than that offered by third-party bidders.159
Additionally, activist hedge funds may bid on a target firm to simply “put it
in play.”160 This action increases the probability that the corporation will be
subject to an eventual takeover.161
Minority shareholders can effectuate substantial change in a
corporation with a minimal ownership stake. Therefore, in Fiduciary Duties
for Activist Shareholders, Lynn A. Stout and Iman Anabtawi suggest that the
fiduciary duty of loyalty should be extended to interested hedge fund
activists in the same way that it attaches to interested transactions by a
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Sullivan and Cromwell, supra note 132, at 9.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Nicole M. Boysona, Nickolay Gantchevb, & Anil Shivdasanib, Activism Mergers, J.
OF
FIN.
ECON.
(forthcoming)
(Oct.
31,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2677416.
157. See id. at 18 (discussing a study conducted by Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004)
finding that acquisition premiums are lower in amount when target managements received an
added personal benefit).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 20.
160. Id. at 23.
161. See id. at 2 (finding a close interrelation between activism and takeovers).
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director or controller.162 It is worth briefly considering applying the fiduciary
duty of loyalty in this manner, where the shareholders would be able to
directly sue the board or the interested activist hedge fund for equitable
relief. However, the fiduciary duty of loyalty would be difficult to apply as
nearly all activist hedge funds are interested in one way or another. Because
nearly all activist hedge funds are interested in a transaction, the effect of
this recommendation could result in increased shareholder litigation against
both directors and officers and activist minority shareholders.
Interested minority shareholders should be subject to a higher standard
of review and oversight than the business judgment rule. However, there are
ways to achieve this goal that don’t involve attaching fiduciary duties to
interested minority shareholders. Therefore, in opposition to Stout and
Anabtawi’s recommendation, this Article argues against the extension of
fiduciary duties. This Article proceeds by explaining the current regulatory
framework of interested minority shareholder transactions and elaborating
on three potential alternative regulatory regimes.
B. Three Alternatives to Regulating Interested Minority Shareholders
The recent debate over shareholder activism has left little doubt that
more attention should be paid to how corporate law regulates interested
transactions by minority shareholders, particularly activist investors and
hedge funds. There are three approaches that can be taken to effectively
regulate interested minority shareholders. The first option is to leave it as is
where the board of directors oversees the conflicts of interest in the
transaction and exercises their good faith and independent business judgment
in approving or denying the deal. The second option is to include minority
shareholders in section 144. Under section 144, the transaction would be
subject to entire fairness review, but the board would have the opportunity
to use one of the three safe harbors to obtain business judgment review. The
third option is to apply Weinberger, where the transaction is initially subject
to entire fairness review unless the board, after full disclosure, obtains the
approval of both an independent negotiating committee and the majority of
minority shareholders.
1. Continuance of Contemporary Law
Currently, interested minority shareholder transactions are not highly
regulated, nor are they scrutinized to the same degree as are interested
162. See Anabtawi, supra note 134, at 1256 (arguing that the rules of fiduciary duties that
have been applied to directors and officers and controlling shareholders should also be applied
to activist minority shareholders).
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director and controlling shareholder transactions. Interested transactions by
minority shareholder investors and activist hedge funds are instead left to the
oversight and business judgment discretion of the board of directors.
Shareholders who believe there is a conflict of interest on the side of an
activist shareholder have minimal recourse in suing the board for knowingly
disregarding a conflict of interest.163 Additionally, the plaintiff shareholders
will likely lose this battle — the board’s decisions will be scrutinized under
the business judgment rule, a standard that is often outcome determinative
for directors.164
The current system of regulation seems to have benefits for both
shareholders and the corporation. Data shows that the market generally
reacts positively after the announcement of activist campaigns by 2–3%
when compared to the broader market.165 Additionally, with the lower
standard of review, activist investors may be more willing to launch
campaigns. If it were the case that an interested transaction by minority
shareholders would be subject to entire fairness on a breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty, minority shareholders, such as activist investors and hedge
funds, may not be as willing to launch campaigns when the probability of
success is lower, and the possibility of shareholder litigation higher.
Additionally, activist shareholders most commonly target struggling
corporations, with the intent to raise profits by improving the internal
organization and capital structure of the corporation.166 With only the intent
to forestall an activist hedge fund attack, a company is recommended to
regularly review its business strategy and its governance and executive
compensation issues.167 The mere threat of an activist hedge fund poking its
head behind the corporation’s proverbial curtain may force companies to
operate more efficiently. Therefore, an increased level of judicial scrutiny
would likely result in fewer benefits afforded by shareholder activism.
However, leaving interested minority shareholder transactions to the
oversight of the board may not be the best practice. There are many ways in
which a board may be coerced by the minority shareholder or feel immense
pressure to adequately make decisions in the best interests of the corporation
163. For example, RBC was trying to have the company sold when it wasn’t a good time
to sell because it was advantageous for the bank to use their position with their client to get
the benefit with the buyers of a different company in a different deal. See RBC Capital Mkts.,
LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 827 (Del. 2015) (holding that the board breached its fiduciary
duty of loyalty by not better monitoring the conflict of interests that existed on behalf of RBC).
164. Latham and Watkins, Business Judgment Rule Applies to Merger Approved by
Informed, Disinterested Stockholders, CLIENT ALERT NEWS FLASH, (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-Delaware-Supreme-Court-decision-KKR.
165. J.P. Morgan, supra note 136, at 3.
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id. at 5.
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and its shareholders. This problem could arise in situations where an activist
threatens to launch a proxy fight to remove directors from the slate.
Directors would then be interested in maintaining their position at the
corporation and would allow a disproportionately beneficial transaction to
go forward. Additionally, directors who are the direct targets of aggressive
public media campaigns may be coerced into taking certain actions in haste
and would therefore become inappropriate overseers and ultimate decisionmakers on these transactions.168
2. Regulate Interested Minority Shareholders and Hedge Fund
Activists Under Weinberger et. al.
The second alternative would be to include interested activist
shareholders within the framework of Weinberger and its progeny. This
method would operate by applying entire fairness review by default to the
board’s decision to approve a transaction with an interested minority
shareholder. The board could escape the high standard of review by: 1) fully
disclosing all material information, 2) obtaining the approval of an
independent special committee, and 3) obtaining the approval of a majority
of the remaining minority shareholders.
Because activist minority shareholders would be included to satisfy the
majority of minority requirement in Weinberger, this test would take away
the conflicted minority shareholders’ right to vote on the transaction. The
effect would be to allow for a truly cleansed and unconflicted majority of the
remaining minority vote. Once these three requirements are satisfied, the
court should not automatically ratify the transaction, but should instead apply
the business judgment rule. This method would treat the interested minority
shareholder transaction like interested controlling shareholder transactions
by initially subjecting it to entire fairness review unless the transaction, after
full disclosure by the board, obtains the good faith approval of an
independent special committee and the majority of the minority shareholders
whom are unaffiliated with the controller.169 Additionally, this approach
168. See Sullivan and Cromwell, supra note 132, at 9 (explaining that an SSGA’s study
found that pressure from activist shareholders may put pressure on companies to pursue shortterm benefits over long-term value and that settlement agreements done in haste and without
sufficient consultation with shareholders divest long-term shareholders of expressing their
views).
169. The entire fairness standard of review is not strictly limited to merger transactions.
Entire fairness also applies to any transaction between a controller and the controlled
corporation where the controller receives a non-ratable benefit. In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting
Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *33 (Del. Ch. Jan.
25, 2016). Courts have additionally applied the entire fairness standard to controlling
shareholders’ management-services agreements, loans, non-competition payments, and third-
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would do the most to protect the remaining minority shareholders from the
adverse effects of profit-maximizing activist investors.
However,
considering the beneficial changes that minority shareholders and activist
hedge funds can bring about in a suffering corporation, subjecting them to
entire fairness review when Weinberger is not satisfied may be too strict a
standard.
Choosing a standard of review in many instances is outcome
determinative.170 Entire fairness is the highest standard of review in
corporate law. The standard is applied in the controlling shareholder context
“as a substitute for the dual statutory protections of disinterested board and
stockholder approval, because both protections are potentially undermined
by the influence of the controller.”171 Therefore, entire fairness is a daunting
standard that often results in a finding of board liability.172 Under entire
fairness review the self-dealing party is “required to demonstrate their utmost
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”173
However, applying entire fairness to interested minority shareholder
transactions can have the negative effect of interfering with a deal that should
get done or altering the structure of the deal.174
Minority activist investors and hedge funds are essentially always
interested to some degree. Applying entire fairness to the entire spectrum of
interested activist hedge fund transactions that do not satisfy Weinberger
could forbid necessary changes and beneficial transactions from surviving
judicial review. Additionally, activist investors are generally not as
dangerous as controlling shareholders are.
A controlling shareholder has powers that are not shared to the same
degree by minority shareholders with small ownership stakes. For instance,
controlling shareholders may occupy a uniquely advantageous position from
which they can extract differential benefits from the corporation at the
expense of minority stockholders. And, independent directors may owe or
party “brokering” payments. See T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 536,
552-55 (Del. Ch. 2000) (applying the entire fairness standard to enjoin management-service
agreements); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-05 (Del. 1987) (holding that the
principle of per se voidability for interested transactions does not necessarily nullify
transactions if they are intrinsically fair); Bomarko, Inc. v. Int’l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d
1161, 1177–83 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000) (applying entire fairness to
undisclosed “brokering” fees).
170. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., Del. Supr., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.
1988) (quoting AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. 1986).
171. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
172. Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1113, n.39 (Del. Ch. 1999).
173. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1983).
174. An example of entire fairness altering the structure of the deal would be for an
interested party to go through a tender offer rather than a merger because the tender offer
would involve fewer fiduciary obligations.

2018]

APPLYING A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

1027

feel a more wholesome allegiance to a controller, rather than to the
corporation and its public stockholders or minority shareholders.
Additionally, there is a legitimate concern regarding the dynamic
between the board of directors and a controlling shareholder. For example,
if a controller owns 50% plus one vote of company stock and does not like
the current board, the controller has the unique advantage of voting not to
reelect members of the board at the next board election. This advantage is
not so readily obtained by minority shareholders with low ownership stakes.
It is further suspicious whether a special committee really replicates an
arm’s length negotiation. For instance, where a controller owns 70% of
company stock and makes a public tender offer for the remaining 30% at a
20% premium over the market value of the shares, the shareholders’ reaction
to the offer of a 20% premium for their shares is no longer indifference. In
this scenario, the public tender offer will result in a substantial portion of the
remaining 30% of shares moving out of the hands of the traditional investors
and into the hands of the controller. Independent directors are now in the
position where they need to apply their business judgment in good faith but
at the same time receive continuous communication from shareholders to get
the deal done. These circumstances place substantial pressure on
independent directors even with the best intentions to fight with the
controller over an incremental premium, with shareholders not wanting to be
protected but simply wanting the transaction approved. In effect, controlling
shareholders can create a controlled mentality with the independent
negotiating committee.
This circumstance does not occur to the same degree with minority
activist shareholders who do not own such a large ownership stake and do
not exercise the same extent of control over the board. Therefore, applying
entire fairness to interested transactions by a controller is a fitting approach
by the Delaware courts. Because minority shareholders and the board of
directors are not prone to the same degree of control by minority activist
shareholders, applying entire fairness is not a necessary substitute for the
“dual statutory protections of disinterested board and stockholder
approval.”175 Applying a lower standard of review than entire fairness would
have more benefits for all parties in the transaction.
3. Regulate Interested Minority Shareholders and Hedge Fund
Activists Under DGCL Section 144
The final alternative regulation would be to amend section 144 to
175. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 644.
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include minority shareholders within the text of the statute. This approach
would allow the board of directors to use the safe harbors of section 144 to
escape entire fairness review by gaining the approval of 1) a majority of
disinterested directors or 2) a majority of disinterested shareholders, or 3) by
proving that the transaction is entirely fair.176 The inclusion of interested
minority shareholders in section 144 would enable the board to cleanse a
transaction that may benefit the corporation and its shareholders were it not
tainted by self-interest. However, a similar precaution may exist as with
controlling shareholders. Courts seem to be concerned that when a
controlling shareholder can potentially exert enough control over a board of
directors, the transaction should require the additional approval of a majority
of minority shareholders.177
The thought process may be the same here. Though section 144(a)(2)
may be sufficient to cleanse a transaction of self-interest by requiring the
approval of a majority of disinterested shareholders, it can be argued that the
approval of a majority of disinterested directors under 144(a)(1) may not be
enough. Though this may be a problem with controlling shareholders, this
prong could satisfactorily cleanse an interested transaction by a minority
shareholder because they do not have the same degree of control over the
board of directors as do controlling shareholders.
Therefore, the suggestion of this Article is to include interested minority
shareholders in section 144 of the DGCL. Amending section 144 to include
minority shareholders would allow for more flexibility in boardroom
decision-making than would entire fairness review and would increase
shareholder protections in comparison to the current regulatory regime.
Increasing shareholder protections while also allowing for a more easily
achieved lowering of the standard of review is justified in these
circumstances. Interested minority shareholders, such as activist investors
and hedge funds can have much needed beneficial effects on target
companies by bringing about valuable changes to profit deficient firms.
Additionally, targets of hedge fund activism may have a higher
incidence of being acquired due to the launch of activism campaigns as an
acquisition proposal.178 This is sometimes beneficial to a corporation where
an activist hedge fund induces third-party overpayment.179 And, interested
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2006).
177. See M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 638 (applying entire fairness review to
interested controller buyout transactions unless “the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both
the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its
duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”).
178. Boysona, supra note 156, at 7.
179. Id. at 8. “Greenwood and Schor (2009) suggest that bidders may overpay when an
activist is present, which makes the target more receptive to an acquisition and increases the
probability that a transaction is consummated.”
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minority activist hedge funds sometimes bid for firms with the main
intention of bringing in a third-party who will overpay to acquire the firm.180
Additionally, value-enhancing operational and financial policies are
positively associated with the announcement of a takeover bid by activist
hedge funds, even if the bid is ultimately unsuccessful.181
However, an interested merger takeover by an activist hedge fund can
have negative implications as well. Where an activist hedge fund is the
offeror in a merger takeover, the target company oftentimes receives a lower
acquisition premium than would be obtained by an outside bidder.182 Activist
investors and hedge funds also have more power than do outside bidders to
push through a takeover offer by using a proxy contest to overcome board
resistance.183 Therefore, activist shareholders can attempt to conduct or
facilitate bids for merger takeovers while owning a minority stake in the
ownership of a corporation. Because activist investors and hedge funds are
profit-maximizing institutions with interested positions that stand on both
sides of a merger transaction as a bidder and shareholder, business judgement
should not be the default rule. Instead, the default level of scrutiny should
be heightened to entire fairness while providing the board of directors with
the three safe harbors of section 144. The test would optimally allow for
increased shareholder protections, while allowing corporations to receive the
beneficial results of minority shareholder hedge fund activism.
An additional benefit to having interested minority activist investors
surpass section 144 would be an increase in the disclosure afforded by these
parties in interested transactions. Minority activist hedge funds that do not
acquire more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities are
not required to file a Schedule 13D. Therefore, their intentions in purchasing
stock remain unknown to the corporation and its shareholders until the 5%
threshold is exceeded. This test would also resolve the problem that 13D
does not explicitly require short positions and hedges to be disclosed in
interested transactions. If an activist hedge fund wants to obtain business
judgment review, this standard highly motivates the fund to disclose all
material information about its short positions and hedges that convey interest
in the transaction so that plaintiffs cannot attack the legitimacy of the deal
180. See id. at 5 (finding that a high incidence of activist hedge fund takeover offers result
in positive returns because activist hedge funds pick firms for which third-party acquirers may
overpay).
181. Id. at 4.
182. Activism mergers with third-party bidders have cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) that are 8% higher than those obtained in non-activism mergers, whereas offers by
activist hedge funds result in 18% lower CARs relative to those in nonactivism mergers.
Activist bidders offer lower acquisition premiums and sustain far higher rejection rates than
third-party bidders. Id.
183. Id. at 8.
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on these grounds.
Finally, to supplement this test in improving disclosure requirements,
an amendment can be made to Item 404 of Schedule 14A to include
interested activist hedge funds as one of the parties requiring heightened
disclosure. Item 404 requires heightened disclosure of material information
regarding transactions that deal with a controller, a related person, or
promoters.184 However, minority shareholders, such as activist investors and
hedge funds, may not fall into any of these categories. By amending Item
404 to make a fourth category including interested transactions by these
minority shareholders, these actors would be statutorily required by the
federal securities laws to disclose their interest in a transaction. These
minority shareholders would also be required to disclose any hedging or
interested positions, the dollar amount at stake in the transaction, and
material contracts with outside third-parties.
Sunlight is the best disinfectant. By amending DGCL section 144 and
Item 404 of Schedule 14A to include minority shareholders, shareholders
and the board of directors will be best prepared to act in a way most
beneficial to the corporation and its shareholders.

184. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2008) (requiring the disclosure of material information
such as dollar amount of the transaction, related person’s interest in the transaction, dollar
amount of interested value in the transaction, etc.).
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CONCLUSION
Delaware corporate law is rightfully suspicious of the fairness of a
transaction when an interested party with sufficient control is involved.
Through DGCL section 144 and Weinberger and its progeny, directors or
officers and controlling shareholders involved in interested transactions are
initially subject to entire fairness review. Such scrutiny attempts to weed out
self-dealing transactions with illegitimate and improper intent. There are,
however, a few ambiguities in the current law of regulating interested
transactions that need to be resolved. First, section 144 should evolve from
a 1967 statute that merely protects an interested director or officer
transaction from voidability to one that operates to lower the level of judicial
scrutiny from entire fairness to business judgment review. Therefore, the
statute should be amended to include that once an interested director or
officer satisfies one of the three safe harbors enumerated, the transaction will
be subject to business judgment review. The effect will be to increase clarity
in the court room and predictability in structuring transactions for the
corporate board room.
Second, Weinberger and its progeny are judge-made laws applying to
interested transactions by controlling shareholders. Weinberger sets out
three methods by which a board or controlling shareholder can survive entire
fairness review. But, the case itself fails to indicate what happens once a
defendant satisfies the three-part test. Subsequent case law, particularly
M&F Worldwide, has created substantively identical tests that once satisfied,
allow an interested controller transaction to be subject to business judgment
review. Therefore, this Article recommends an interpretation of Weinberger
consistent with M&F Worldwide, lowering the standard of review to
business judgment once an interested controlling shareholder transaction is
approved by an independent special committee, fully disclosed, and
approved by a majority of minority shareholders.
Additionally, directors, officers, and controlling shareholders are not
the only parties that engage in interested transactions.
Minority
shareholders, especially activist hedge funds, often engage in interested
transactions with the corporation as well. However, Delaware statutory law
and case law has only attached fiduciary duties and increased judicial
scrutiny to interested transactions by the former category and have left
interested minority shareholder and activist hedge fund transactions nearly
unregulated. This Article advocates that minority activist shareholders and
hedge funds should be subject to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than
business judgment review to afford for greater shareholder protection and
increased disclosure in self-dealing transactions. This test would involve
amending DGCL section 144 to include minority shareholders. This test
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would then subject interested minority shareholder transactions to entire
fairness review while affording the board of directors the three safe harbors
of section 144 to lower the standard of review to business judgment. This
threshold would effectively increase disclosure requirements and encompass
some minority shareholders that slip through the cracks of Schedule 13D.
The final recommendation of this Article is to further increase the
disclosure requirements of minority shareholders, particularly activist hedge
funds that engage in interested transactions. Heightened disclosure can be
achieved through an amendment to include interested minority shareholders
as a fourth party in Item 404 of Schedule 14A. This would have the
beneficial effect of requiring the disclosure of all material facts related to an
activist hedge fund’s self-dealing in the transaction. Through this heightened
disclosure requirement shareholders and the board of directors would have
all of the material information needed to make a more informed vote on the
transaction.

